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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
1965 - 1966
In response to the favorable commentary received from
North Dakota practitioners, the "North Dakota Law Review
is continuing the practice, established two year sago, of di-
gesting significant decisions of the North Dakota Supreme
Court. The following are decTsLons handed down by the
court between June, 1965, and June, 1966.
IMPLIED WARRANTY-PRIVITY REQUIREMENT
In Lang v General Motors Corporation' the North Dakota Su-
preme Court held for the first time that privity requirement was
no longer necessary for a suit between a consumer and a manufact-
urer where the manufacturer of a new motor vehicle puts such new
vehicle into channels of trade and promotes its sale to the public
by a wide program of advertising.
The plaintiff based his suit on negligence and on breach of
warranty, alleging that the vehicle in question was not reasonably
fit for the purposes for which it was produced. The defendant denied
all of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint and alleged "that the
vehicle described m the complaint was sold to the plaintiff by the
Kline Chevrolet Company, of Minneapolis; that the seller is a sep-
arate corporation, engaged in the business of selling the defendant's
products, that there were no dealings between the plaintiff and the
defendant and no privity of contract between them, and that no
implied warranties to the plaintiff could arise from the plaintiff's
purchase of such vehicle from a third party ",2
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order of summary
judgment for the defendant. In relaxing the pnvity requirement,
the court put great weight on the fact that modern business dealings
have become complex and "the vast majority of transactions no
1. 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965).
2. Supra note 1 at 807.
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longer involve simply a buyer and a seller "3 Furthermore, said
the court, the buyer may be subject to intensive advertising by the
manufacturer which induces the buyer to rely on representations
made by the products' manufacturer
The court noted that the privity requirement was relaxed first
in food and drink cases, 4 then in cosmetic cases, " and later in
cases involving dangerous products. 6 It should also be noted that
the plaintiff's damages were his expenses for correcting the defects
which he alleges were due to the defendant's poor manufacture and
assembly This case represents a further relaxation of the privity
requirement, since the earlier cases usually involved personal in-
jury 7 The court felt that the ultimate consumers can only be
protected by eliminating the requirement of privity
JUDGMENT-RES JUDICATA
In Bismarck Public School District No. 1 v Hirsh8 a dispute
arose over ownership of certain wood and steel bleachers situated
on a tract of land owned by the defendant. The deed conveying the
land to the defendants was dated August 1 1963 and filed August 28,
1963 with the Register of Deeds.
An order of dismissal with prejudice of a complaint was entered
August 27, 1963, against the defendants' grantor in a collateral dis-
pute over the land. The plaintiff claims that the defendant is bound
by this judgment entered against the defendants' grantor The Dis-
trict Court of Burleigh County sustained the plaintiff's contentions
by entering a summary judgment in their favor The Supreme Court
of North Dakota reversed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata
does not bind the defendant in this instance.
The court, applying the doctrine of res judicata, which binds
only parties to the action in which the judgment was rendered and
their privies and does not effect strangers to the judgment who are
neither parties nor in privity with a party to the action, 9 found the
3. Supra note 2 at 808.
4. Simmins v. Wichita Coca Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d. 633 (1957)
Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479
(1942).
5. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612, 75 A.LR.2d
103 (1958).
6. Markovick v. McKesson & Robins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958).
7. E.g., supra notes 4, 5, & 6. "Either lack of privity should always be a defense
in these cases, or it never should be." Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply
Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 at 878 (1958).
8. 136 N.W.2d 449 (N.D. 1965).
9. 'Feather v. Krause, 91 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1958).
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defendant not in privity because the date of the commencement of
the collateral action was subsequent to the date of the defendant's
succession to the rights of the property in question.
As the defendant had no notice of the collateral or subsequent
action affecting the property, the court held "that the result of the
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel or res judicata could
not be defended on principles of fundamental fairness in the due
process sense." 10
The court followed the great weight of authority in this juris-
diction" and in others 2 in applying the privity rule. The defendant
was not in privy to the judgment because his succession to the
rights of property in question occurred previous to the institution
of the suit.
JURIES-POLLING OF JURORS
Plaintiff was a passenger in a car operated by defendant who
lost control of the car and crashed into a gasoline truck. Plaintiff
was injured as a result of this accident and now seeks damages.
After being instructed, the jury retired and later returned for further
instructions as to whether a violation of the rules of the road con-
stitutes gross negligence. Upon further instruction, the jury again
retired and returned with a verdict of not guilty The jurors were
then polled and one juror disagreed with the verdict. The court
questioned him as to his reasons for dissenting, and the juror stated
that he would like to find liability on mere negligence. The court
stated this was not possible, that gross negligence had to be found.
The juror replied that no evidence was offered to constitute gross
negligence and that he would therefore assent to the verdict.
On appeal, plaintiff alleged error in that the jury should have
been sent out for further deliberation after the juror dissented. The
Supreme Court of North Dakota held, two justices dissenting, that
this did constitute error and granted a new trial. The court arrived
at this conclusion by interpreting sections 28-14-18 and 28-14-23 of the
Century Code.'3 Section 28-14-18 permits the jury to render its ver-
dict in court without retiring to the jury room to deliberate. Section
28-14-23 requires that when a poll of the jury reveals that at least
one juror disagrees with the verdict, the jury must be sent out for
10. Supra note 8 at 454.
11. Hull v. Rolfsrud, 65 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1954).
12. Hawkeye Life Ins. Co. v. Valley-Des Moines Co., 220 ,Iowa 556, 260 N.W 669, 105
A.L.R. 1018 (1935).
13. N.D. CENT. CovE i§ 28-14-18 & 28-14-23 (10ia.
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further deliberation. The court harmonized these statutes by stat-
ing that since the jury retired to the jury room for deliberation,
section 28-14-18 ceases to apply and section 28-14-23 is then appli-
cable; thus, the trial court erred in not sending the jurors out for
further deliberation.
The dissent was based on the fact that obviously the juror was
only dissenting to the law since he wanted to find liability on mere
negligence rather than gross negligence. His verdict was actually
in accord with the rest of the jury and there was no need for
further deliberation.
14
The ruling in this case seems to be in accord with most juris-
dictions.' 5 The rule seems to imply that any dissent from the ver-
dict shall constitute a reason for further deliberation. Some courts
have avoided this strict construction by stating that if a juror dis-
sents but indicates that he agreed for the sake of harmony, there
is no need for further deliberation since a certain amount of har-
mony is needed for every verdict.16 One court, in an old decision,
indicated that as long as the juror does not specifically say, "I dis-
sent," a comment by a juror would not vitiate the verdict.1
7
The case at hand and the above cases seem to have one thing
in common. They appear to indicate that before any rule can be
applied, there must be an indication by the juror as to why he
dissents. In the case at hand, the juror indicated his disagreement
and the court proceeded to question him as to why he disagreed.
In Williams v Williams,'s the court stated that if the juror indicates
that he agreed for the sake of harmony, there is no need for further
deliberation. In Conyers v Kirk,19 the fact that a comment by a
juror would not vitiate the verdict seems to imply that even if the
juror says, "I dissent," a comment as to why he dissents is neces-
sary The fact that a juror has to indicate his reason seems to
run against the very idea of polling a jury and sending them out
for further deliberation. For a court to properly adhere to the rule
laid down, the jury must be sent out for further deliberation im-
mediately upon an indication of dissent. The rule does not allow
the disclosure of any reasons for such dissent. The dissenting opm-
ion in Stradinger v Hatzenbuhler2 0 loses its significance since no
one but the juror should know why he dissents. What purpose would
14. Stradinger v. Hatzenbuhler, 137 N.W.2d 212 (1965).
15. E. g., Bruce v. Chestnut Farms - Chevy Chase Dairy, 126 F.2d 224, (1942) Far-
mer v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Kan. 951, 67 P.2d 511 (1937) , Williams v. North Alabama
Exp., 83 So.2d 330 (1955), Weatherhead v. Bureau, 238 Minn. 134, 55 N.W.2d 703 (1952).
16. Williams v. Williams, 112 Ark. 507, 166 S.W. 552 (1914).
17. Conyers v. Kirk, 78 Ga. 480, 3 S.E. 442 (1887).
18. Supra note 15.
19. Supra note 16.
20. Supra note 13.
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be served by sending the jury back for further deliberation if his
reasons can be ironed out in open court? Whether this is the best
policy or not is irrelevant. Strict construction of the rule demands
this result.
Probably the best solution to overcoming this obstacle is that
pointed up in Reed v Kennick.2 1 There it was decided that a trial
judge should be given considerable latitude in conducting a trial be-
cause the ultimate fairness of a judicial proceeding depends upon
his wisdom and good judgment. 22 Using his discretion, a judge
could determine whether or not the objection to the verdict is worthy
of further deliberation. By allowing this discretion, the judge would
also have the right to question a juror to find out why he dissents.
This is what the courts are doing now, but under the common rule
this does not appear to be permissible.
NEGLIGENCE-CHARITABLE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court in Granger v Deaconess Hospital of Grand
Forks,23 a negligence suit by a patient against a hospital, affirmed
a decision of the District Court, Grand Forks County, allowing the
patient's motion to strike the defense of charitable immunity and
held the charitable corporate hospital liable for injuries to the patient
caused by the negligence of the hospital's employees. "As we have
never applied the doctrine of charitable immunity in our state, '2 4
cases from jurisdictions which have accepted the doctrine have little
stare decisis value; and the question to be determined is if the
doctrine should now be accepted. The court did discuss the doctrine
in two prior cases, 25 but it was not applied in either case as the
institutions in question were held to be run for profit and that por-
tion of the decision is therefore not part of the court's holding in
either case. Although the doctrine of immunity was itself judge-
made, some states rationalize the acceptance of the doctrine on the
basis of legislative approval due to the fact that the legislatures
have failed to repudiate it.6 In the principle case, the North Dakota
Supreme Court said, "In the absence of statutory exemption, a non-
profit corporation is liable for its torts the same as any other cor-
21. 389 Pa. 143, 132 A.2d 208 (1957).
22. Supra note 13.
23. 138 N.W.2d 443 (N.D. 1965).
24. Supra note 23, at 445.
25. Boetcher v. Budd, 237 N.W 650 (N.D. 1931) Fawacett v. Ryder, 23 N.D. 20,
135 N.W 800 (1912).
26. Howard v. South Baltimore Gen. Hosp., 191 M.D. 617, 62 A.2d 574 (1948) , Smith
V. Congregation of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 61 N.W.2d 896 (1953).
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poration. ' ' 27 The latter view would seem the soundest as it does
not advocate judicial abrogation of legislative duties.
The original justification for immunity was known as the "trust
fund theory " "To give damages out of a trust fund would not be
to apply it to those objects whom the author of the trust had in view,
but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose. ' 2s The
best answer to this argument would seem to be that donors have
neither the power nor the intention to exempt the objects of their
philanthropy from the object of the ordinary laws of the land. 29 Fur-
thermore, this argument would not seem consistent with decisions
holding charities liable for damages for breach of contract and for
negligence to certain classes of people, such as its employees.30
Other arguments favoring the doctrine have been the inapplica-
bility of the doctrine of respondent superior, because the charity
gets no profit from the enterprise in which it engages its employees,3 1
and the implied waiver or assumption of risk by the plaintiff.32
The real public policy behind the doctrine is to protect and encour-
age donations to charity, but it seems doubtful if its destruction
would discourage such donations.
33
The trend of recent cases seems to repudiate the doctrine of
charitable immunity Some jurisdictions have limited the application
of the doctrine to protection of property which is part of a charit-
able trust;3 4 other limitations depend on the activities of the
charity35 or on who has been injured. Still others have repudiated
the doctrine altogether and treat the charity the same as any other
ordinary individual or corporation 2 6 Only three junsdictions-Ala-
ska, Vermont, and Delaware-other than North Dakota, have "re-
jected the immunity rule as a matter of first impression." 3
27. Supra note 24.
28. Feofees of Herlot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F 507, 513, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508
(1846).
29. Annot., 25 A. L. R. 2d 64 (1952).
30. Supra note 29 at 62.
31. Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc., 218 Wis. 169, 260 N. W 476 (1935).
32. Wilcox v. Idaho Falls L. D. S. Hosp., 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 849 (1938) , Annot.,
25 A. L. R. 2d 68 (1952).
33. President & Directors of Georgetowi College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D. C. Cir.
1942).
34. 0'Connor v. Boulder Colo. Sanitorium Assn., 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d 835 (1939)
Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N.E.2d 342 (1942) Moore v. Moyle 405
Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950) , Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127
S.W.2d 284 (1938).
35. Peden v. Furman University, 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907 (1930) , Smith v. Congrega-
tion of St. Rose, 265 Wisc. 393, 61 N.W.2d 896 (1953).
36. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 75 (1952).
37. HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 29.17 at 1675 (1956).
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NEGLIGENCE-BAILMENT FOR HIRE
A fire occurred in defendant's body shop and as a result,
plaintiff's property was destroyed. The owner and employees were
not inside the body shop when the fire started, but the owner stated
that several precautions had been taken to insure safety in the
shop. The plaintiffs proceeded on the theory that they had left their
cars with defendant as a bailee for hire for certain repairs and that
there was a failure to return them. The trial court could find no
direct evidence of negligence but concluded that there was a greater
probability that the fire was caused by the defendant's negligence
than from a cause for which the defendant would not be responsible.
The Supreme Court found that a bailment for hire situation was
created and that the bailee must exercise ordinary care m the pres-
ervation of the bailor's property while it is being repaired. The
ordinary care required of a bailee is such care as would be ex-
ercised by a reasonably prudent person under the same circum-
stances. The court pointed out that the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the defendant was responsible for some negligent act
or omission and that such act or omission was the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injury 3s The court followed the modern rule that
where a bailment for lire is proved and defendant bailee refused
to return the goods, there is a presumption of negligence on the part
of the bailee. The bailee must then show that the property was lost
or destroyed and the manner in which it was lost. The burden of
proof does not shift but the bailor is merely aided by the presump-
tion. The bailor must still establish a prima facie case and then
the burden shifts. The trier of facts must then determine whether
the defendants were in fact negligent. If, after considering all of
the evidence, including the inference of negligence, the trier of fact
is not persuaded that loss was due to the defendant's negligence,
the decision must be for defendants because the plaintiffs have failed
to sustain the burden of proving negligence.
The court found that the evidence introduced by the defendant
was sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence but the
inference of negligence still remained and, feeling that the plaintiffs
had sustained the burden of proof, the court held for the plaintiffs.
In his dissent, Judge Strutz points out that this decision wipes out
any requirement that the burden is upon the plaintiff to establish
not only negligence, but that the defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury Judge Strutz claims this de-
38. Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grand Forks Implement Co., 79 N.D. 177, 55
N.W.2d 316 (1952).
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cision places upon the operator of a body shop the burden of showing
not only that he used due care but he must show what caused the
fire and that it was not ,due to his negligence. When a fire of un-
known cause occurs, the operator becomes responsible and this nec-
essarily makes him an insurer of all automobiles left at his garage.
He contends this is contrary to the general rule adopted by the
majority of courts and he criticizes the court for citing the proper
rules but then failing to apply them.39
Although the majority opinion is not written as clearly as it
might be, it appears that the correct rules were applied to the facts
in this case. The court is not concerned with a mere negligence
question but rather with the question of bailment. It is well establish-
ed that when a bailment situation is created, the bailor need only
show that he delivered the goods and that they were not returned.
4 0
It is then up to the bailee to show why the goods were not returned.
4 1
A presumption of negligence arises and the bailee must prove facts
which show that he was not negligent.42 If the bailee can introduce
evidence to overcome this presumption, the bailor must then go for-
ward with proof of negligence.4 8 In order for the bailee to show
that he was not negligent, he must prove the actual circumstances
of the loss."4 Clearly, in the case at hand the defendant could not
show the actual cause of the fire; thus it would appear that the
case had not reached the point where the plaintiff would be required
to prove negligence.
NEGLIGENCE-GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
In Fetzer v Minot Park District,4" an action for damages for
death by drowning caused by the alleged negligence of the pool
employees in the operation of a swimming pool, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to "governmental
immunity."
This doctrine of governmental immunity can be traced to the
position of the king m medieval time and his identification with
the concept of "sovereignty" which arose during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.46
39. McKenzie v. Hanson, 143 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1966).
40. Gardner v. Jonothan Club, 35 Cal. 343, 217 P.2d 961 (1950).
41. Ibid.
42. Burt v. Blackfoot Motor Supply Co., 67 Idaho 548, 186 P.2d 498 (1947).
43. Frissell v. John W Rogers, Inc., 141 Conn. 308, 106 A.2d 162 (1954).
44. Leake & Nelson Co. v. W J. Megin, Inc., 142 Conn. 99, 111 A.2d 559 (1955).
45. 13 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965).
46. HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.3 (1956).
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The breadth of the defense of governmental immunity is the
subject of a wide split of authority4 7 In the narrow area of liability
for the maintenance and operation of a swimming pool there are
two lines of cases.4 8 The Massachusetts rule holds that the main-
tenance and operation of a swimming pool is a governmental func-
tion and the city or park district is immune from liability.4 The
New York rule, which represents the modern trend of municipal
law,50 holds that the operation and maintenance of a public swim-
ming pool is a mere "private" or "corporate" function which if
performed in a negligent manner, imposes liability on the city or
park district. 51
Plaintiff m the instant case argued that the defense of govern-
mental immunity is archaic and outmoded. 52  But Judge Strutz,
speaking for the court, said that while this may be so it is up to the
legislature and not the courts to change the law
The North Dakota Constitution 53 provides that governmental
subdivisions, when acting in their governmental capacities, can be
sued only "in such manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as
the legislative assembly may direct." Combining this language with
the language of a previous North Dakota case- that "[i]n this
state a park district in the performance of its duties, is engaged
in the performance of a public duty and the performance of such
duty is a governmental function," the court felt constrained to hold
that the negligent acts of the employees of the swimming pool fall
within the governmental function and are entitled to governmental
immunity However, the Holgerson case is distinguishable from the
present case in that the only appellate question in Holgerson was
whether the individual members of the park district board could
be held liable for the acts of the board. In the instant case, the
action was against the board as an entity.
The North Dakota Century Code 55 provides that a park district
can "sue and be sued" and that it shall have a seal and perpetual
succession, it may contract, it may purchase real estate. These are
the traditional attributes of a private corporation."6
This is arguably direction and recognition by the legislative
47. See Felton v. City of Great Falls, 169 P.2d 229 (1946), which gives an extensive
review of cases dealing with swimming pools.
48. Id. at 230.
49. Ibid.
50. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 11.14 (1966).
51. Felton v. City of Great Falls, supra note 47.
52. Fetzer v. Minot Park District, 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965).
53. N.D. CONST. § 22.
54. Holgerson v. City of Devils Lake, 63 N.D. 155, 246 N.W 641 (1933).
55. N.D. CENT CODE §40-49-04 (1960).
56. HENN, CORPORATIONS §90.
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assembly that the park district can commit private or proprietary
acts which allow it to sue and be sued. Indeed, m his opinion,
Judge Strutz states, "While the plaintiff did contend that the de-
fendant, m maintaining a swimming pool, was not engaged in a
governmental function, he did not stress the argument." If the
defense of governmental immunity arises again, the argument that
the action committed was proprietary should be stressed and should
be given serious consideration by the court if the legislature does
not act to narrow the defense of governmental Immunity The dis-
tinction between proprietary and governmental functions is valid.
It is sound to hold the municipal corporation liable for negligence
while performing proprietary functions which are entirely for the
private advantage of the inhabitants of the city or park district.
A municipal corporation has "two classes of power: one legislative,
public, governmental, in the exercise of which it is a sovereignty
and governs its people; the other proprietary, quasi-pnvate, con-
ferred upon it, not for the purpose of governing its people, but for
the private advantage of the inhabitants. 5 7 For these "private"
services the municipal corporation should receive no different treat-
ment than would the private citizen or corporation if it were providing
the services. This is not the proper place for the defense of govern-
mental immunity
NEGLIGENCE-GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
In Kaczor v City of Minot,5 8 plaintiff sued for injuries caused
by the alleged negligent operation of the city dump by the defendant.
The supreme court held that the city has governmental immunity
citing Fetzer v Minot Park Distrct.59 The court has held previously
that disposal of garbage is a governmental function of a municipal
corporation and not an act within its corporate or private capacity 60
Judge Knutson stated "[I]f it is desirable to change the rule of
law, well settled in the state, the request for such change should
be addressed to the legislative assembly "61 However, the original
determination that the activity was governmental and not propri-
etary was made by the court and if the legislature does not act,
it is respectfully urged that the court hold the disposal of garbage
57. Savage v. City of Tulsa, 174 Okla. 416, 50 P.2d 712 (1935) (syllabus).
58. 138 N.W.2d 784 (N.D. 1965).
59. 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965).
60. Mountain v. City of Fargo, 38 N.D. 432, 166 N.W. 416 (1917), Moulton v. City of
Fargo, 39 N.D. 502, 167 N.W 717 (1917).
61. Kawzor v. City of Minot, 138 N.W.2d 784 (N.D. 1965).
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to be a "private" activity The rule seems archaic and uniust,
especially since the authorization by the legislative assembly allow-
ing political subdivisions to purchase liability insurance.6 2 The munic-
ipal corporation should be forced to accept the responsibility for
its nigligent acts.
PROCEDURE-CLASS ACTIONS
Armour and Company sold a milk and butter processing plant
to Donald Wadzinski in 1961. Wadzinski operated the plant as the
Capital Milk Products Company until he became indebted to three
hundred or more patrons of the plant who had furnished milk or
cream for processing. In 1962, the patrons assumed management
of the company and operated it as the Capital Milk Patrons Com-
mittee. Wadzinski was still indebted to Armour and Company and
when, in 1962, a shipment of butter under a bill of lading signed
"Capital Milk Products" was sent to Armour and Company which
retained the proceeds to apply toward satisfying the Wadzinski debt.
The plaintiffs claim that the patrons produced the butter at their
expense while operating the milk product plant, that the butter be-
longs to the patrons, and they are entitled to the proceeds which
Armour and Company hold and apply to Wadzinski's debt.
The District Court, Burleigh County, entered a judgment of
$7,531.95 for plaintiffs and the defendants appeal. The Supreme
Court held that the action was a spurious class suit but there were
defects m that the represented members of the class were not before
the court.6 3 The court ordered a new trial to determine the amount
of compensatory damages to which each patron plaintiff is entitled
and ordered the trial court to allow the other patron members to
intervene as parties plaintiff.
The central issue of the case seems to be whether or not the
plaintiffs are proper parties impowered to bring this action. The
court held that those plaintiffs who were not members of the com-
pany were not parties in interest and, therefore, not proper parties
to the action. The court held that the patron plaintiffs were proper
parties and could bring suit on their own right and on behalf of
the other patrons under Rule 23 (a) (3) of the North Dakota rules
of Civil Procedure. This rule provides:
If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
62. N.D. CENT. CoDE §40-43-07 (1965).
63. Bath v. Armour and Co., 136 N.W.2d 142 (N.D. 1965).
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it impracticable to bring them all before the Court, such of
them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate repre-
sentation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when
the character of the right sought to be enforced for or
against the class is several, and there is a common question
of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common
relief is sought.
The court goes on to say, "It is generally held that a spurious
class suit is a permissive ]oinder device." 64 If this is true, "the
judgment has no effect except as to the parties named on the record,
it may be that little is gained by saying that those persons actually
named represent other members of the class, these 'nameless and
as yet disembodied spirits' as a distinguished court has named
them."6 5 The plaintiffs only claim a right to share in the proceeds
of the sale to the defendant in proportion to the amount of the
debt owed to each of the patrons by Wadzinski. It would seem that
the consequence of this class action as far as the nonparty patrons
are concerned is that it is an open invitation for them to join in
the suit. Furthermore, only the parties who are patrons are bound
by the judgment, and if the other patrons refuse to enter the suit
the judgment cannot be held to bind them.66 Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure there may be some purpose to such an
action, '7 but in state courts there would seem to be little purpose
in section 3 of Rule 23 (a) 68
PROCEEDS OF ESTATE-WILLS-INTERPRETATION
Graves v First Natlonal Bank in Grand Forks"9 is an appeal from
an order of the district court affirming an order of the county court
allowing a final report and accounting and distribution of the pro-
ceeds of an estate. The will contained a provision which on its fac%
seemed to promote the breakup of a marital relationship. The countq
court refused to construe the will, holding that this was not within
the jurisdiction of the county court, and the district court affirmed.
No testimony was taken in the county court and the only record
that was available to the supreme court as to the meaning of the
objectionable provision was the will itself. The supreme court held
64. Supra note 63. at 149.
65. BARRON & HOLTZOgF, FEDhmAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Wright ed. 1961) § 562.3 at
276.
66. Beadle v. Daniels, 362 P.2d 128 (Wyo. 1961).
67. Supra note 4, 275 & n.36.4.
68. N.D.R. Civ. P., Rule 23 (a) (3).
69. 138 N.W.2d 584 (N.D. 1965).
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that the county court has jurisdiction, not only to construe an ambigu-
ous will m aid of administration of an estate, but to determine the
validity of a part or all of a willy 0 They held further that the clause
obiected to was on its face invalid as repugnant to public policy
Judge Teigen dissented in part, saying that the case was not ripe
and should go back to the district court for testimony relating to
the intention of the testator in placing the objectionable portions
in the will. The majority disagreed saying that as the language of
the will is clear and unambiguous and the intent of the testator
must be determined from the language itself.71 However the court
has just recognized that it was within the jurisdiction and was the
duty of the county court to interpret the will. Section 56-05-01 of the
North Dakota Century Code provides that "a will is to be construed
according to the intention of the testator " It further provides that
his intention is to be carried out to the fullest degree possible. Where,
as here, it appears that there may be a provision that is repugnant
to public policy it would seem to be an appropriate place to take
evidence to clarify the meaning of the testator in placing the pro-
visions within the will. While it must be borne in mind that no extrinsic
evidence is ever competent to control, vary, or add to the terms
of the will 7 2 it can be used to explain them. A will must be con-
strued so as to give full force and effect to the purpose of the
testator 73 This would seem to be better carried out by allowing
a record to be built in the county court, rather than from the cold
words that are available to the supreme court with no evidence
of surrounding circumstances.
PROPERTY-AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE
Plaintiff is operator under certain oil and gas leases and brings
this action to resolve conflicting claims as to oil and gas royalties.
In 1931, one Carrie Ceynar was holder of record title to certain
lands. At that time her husband joined with her in mortgaging the
property to the State of North Dakota to secure a loan. They later
assigned and conveyed royalties aggregating 10 per cent of the oil
and gas produced on that land. A provision in the assignment in-
cluded the following warranty-
(A) I do hereby assign said royalty under the lease now
70. See, 4 PAGE, WILLS 1 31.5 at 188 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1961).
71. Graves v. First National Bank in Grand Forks, eupra note 69.
72. In Re Glavhee's Estate, 34 N.W.2d 300, 306 (N.D. 1948.).
78. Id. at 805.
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covering said lands as well as any lease, or leases, that
may be hereafter made covering said premises, and agree
to warrant and defend the title to the same, and that I
have lawful authority to sell and assign said royalty
The state instituted foreclosure proceedings and no redemption was
made from the foreclosure sale. Some years later, the husband pur-
chased the land from the state. He now contends that the grantees
to the royalty assignments no longer have an interest since he was
an indispensible party to the signing of the assignments of the roy-
alty interests. In essence, he is contending that his purchase of the
land in his name did not inure to the benefit of the grantees and
that they can no longer claim a share of the royalties. The court
found that the husband had a warranty obligation after he joined
in the signing of the deed of his wife's separate property and that
his later purchase murred to the benefit of the original grantees.74
The court in the present case relied heavily on a prior North
Dakota decision with similar facts.75 In that case, the court found
section 47-1015, North Dakota Revised Code of 1943,76 which is
identical to 47-10-15, North Dakota Century Code, to be inapplic-
able, stating that the assignment of royalty does not purport to grant
real property in fee simple, rather, it is in the nature of a quit-
claim and an after-acquired title does not pass by virtue of the
statute.77 The court has previously held that an assignment of
royalty is a grant of interest in real property 7 s thus, a covenant of
warranty of title to real estate would run with the land79 when the
grantor agreed to warrant and defend the title to the assigned in-
terest. The court in Corbett v LaBere5 ° went on to say that a
warranty would not enlarge the estate conveyed, but may operate
as an estoppel:
[T]he addition of a warranty against the grantor or those
claiming by, through, or under him will not estop the grantor
to assert a title subsequently acquired, assuming that it is
not derived through any act or conveyance of his own prior
to the deed in question.
The doctrine of estoppel is thereby given great weight and may be
the only recourse of a defrauded grantee. The very idea of the doc-
74. Skeily Oil Co. v. A. M. Fruh Co., 137 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1964).
75. Aure v. Mackhoff, 93 N.W.2d 807 (1958).
76. N.D.R.C. § 47-1015, 1943. After-Acquired Title-Where a person purports by pro-
per instrument to grant real property in fee simple and subsequently acquires any title or
claim of title thereto, the same passes by operation of law to the grantee or his sucessors.
77. Accord, Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1956).
78. Corbett v. LaBere, 68 N.W.2d 211 (N.D. 1955).
79. N.D. CENT CODA § 47-04-26 (1960).
80. Supra note 78.
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trme of estoppel is to accomplish a result which conforms with the
intent of the parties so that justice will be properly served.8 ' Ob-
viously, the warranty in the instant case has some meaning and
the only fair construction that can be attributed to this language
is to estop the grantor from later asserting a better title.
The doctrine of estoppel has not always been construed as such.
In Rowell v Rowel, 8 2 having similar facts, using a statute identical
to section 47-10-15,83 and agreeing that the doctrine of passing after
acquired title is based on estoppel, the Montana Supreme Court
reached a contrary result. The court in that case construed the
statute 4 to apply in cases where, at the time of the grant, the title
of the grantor was either defective or lacking, and subsequent to
the grant, the grantor obtained title or some portion thereof. The
court went on to say that the grantor is estopped to assert an
after-acquired title only when such assertion would involve the denial
that the conveyance passed the interest or estate which it purported
to pass. The grantor passed a fee simple, which was the interest
he purported to pass, but the interest was lost by the subsequent
foreclosure. Thus, his after-acquired title was a new and indepen-
dent one.85 When confronted with the covenant of warranty, the
Montana court referred to a prior case which stated that ordinarily
a covenant of warranty, when broken, ceases to run with the land
and becomes a chose in action. The rights of the grantee are barred
by the foreclosure decree, sale, confirmation and sheriff's deed, and




81. Sisson v. Swift, 243 Ala. 289, 9 So.2d 891 (1942).
82. 119 Mont. 201, 174 P.2d 223 (1946).
83. MONT. I1v. CODE § 6867 (1921).
84. Ibid.
85. Supra note 82.
86. Midland Realty Co. v. Halverson, 101 Mont. 49, 52 P.2d 159 (1935). See also,
Schultz v. Cities Service Oil Co., 149 Kan. 148. 86 P.2d 533 (1939).
